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MISSOURI v. JENKINS
115 S.Ct. 2038 (1995)
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
The United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to resolve the latest dispute in a ten year long litiga-
tion battle between the State of Missouri and Kansas
City schoolchildren over a court-imposed school deseg-
regation plan.
FACTS
Prior to 1954, the State of Missouri mandated seg-
regated schools for black and white children.' Immedi-
ately following Brown v. Board of Education,2 the State's
Attorney General declared Missouri's school segrega-
tion laws unenforceable; 3 however, neither the State of
Missouri nor the Kansas City, Missouri School District
(KCMSD) moved to dismantle the system of separate
education.' In 1984, thirty years after Brown, the Fed-
eral district court for the Western District of Missouri
determined that the State and the KCMSD had failed
in their affirmative obligation to reform the public
school system in the KCMSD,5 and, accordingly, the
district court launched a court-supervised plan of de-
segregation in 1985.6 Neither the State nor the KCMSD
appealed the district court's finding of liability, and over
the next ten years, the district court entered a series of
remedial orders aimed at eliminating the vestiges of seg-
regation.7
The district court's desegregation plan has been
described as the most ambitious and expensive reme-
dial program in the history of school desegregation.8
Based upon the district court's finding that segregation
caused a system-wide reduction in student achievement
IMissouri v. Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. 2038, 2052 n.6 (1995).
2347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3 115 S.Ct. at 2052 n.6.
4 Id. at 2074.
5 Id. at 2042 (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F.Supp. 1485,
1490 (W.D. Mo. 1984)).
6id. at 2042 (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F.Supp. 19,
24 (W.D. Mo. 1985)).
'115 S.Ct. at 2074.
8 1d. at 2044.
See id. at 2042-2045 (describing district court's desegre-.
gation plan). .
'0 Id. at 2044. In Missouri v. Jenkins the Supreme Court
observed:
These massive expenditures have financed high schools
in which every classroom will have air conditioning, an alarm
system, and 15 microcomputers; a 2,000-square-foot plan-
etarium; green houses and vivariums; a 25-acre farm with an
air-conditioned meeting room for 104 people; a Model United
Nations wired for language translation; broadcast capable ra-
dio and television studios with an editing and animation lab; a
temperature controlled art gallery; movie editing and screen-
as well as "white flight" from the District, the district
court imposed a desegregation scheme broadly designed
to provide high-quality education to the District school-
children and to attract non-minority students to the
KCMSD schools.9 By 1990 the school facilities in the
District were widely recognized as far superior to any
other public school facilities in the country. 0 Nonethe-
less, many of the District's schools continued to have
disproportionately high numbers of black students, " and
test scores of students in the District remained below
the national average.' 2 Accordingly, the district court
continued to monitor the District and continued to ap-
prove additional, increasingly expensive educational pro-
grams.
The State of Missouri, through the operation ofjoint-
and-several liability, bore the brunt of the costs-of de-
segregation.' 3 As a result, the State brought multiple law-
suits, 4 three of which reached the United States Su-
preme Court on the merits.' The heart of the dispute in
the 1995 case before the Supreme Court was whether
the State of Missouri had satisfied its legal obligation
under Brown v. Board of Education and therefore whether
the State should have been released from judicial super-
vision notwithstanding the low test scores of students in
the District and the racial imbalance in many of the
District's schools.
I. QUALITY EDUCATION PROGRAMS
As part of the 1985 desegregation program, the dis-
trict court ordered the adoption of a wide range of qual-
ing rooms; a 3,500-square-foot dust-free diesel mechanics
room; 1,875-square-foot elementary school animal rooms for
use in a zoo project; swimming pools; and numerous other
facilities. Id. at 2045.
"1 Id. at 2050.
21d. at 2055.
'31d. at 2045.
N See, ag., Jenkins v. Missouri, 539 F.Supp. 1485 (W.D.
Mo. 1984); Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F.Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo.
1985); Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F.Supp. 400 (W.D. Mo. 1987);
Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F3d 755 (8th Cir. 1993); Jenkins v.
Missouri, 13 F3d 1170 (8th Cir. 1993); Jenkins v. Missouri, 19
F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1994); Jenkins v. Missouri, 23 F.3d 1297
(8th Cir. 1995).
'SMissouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989) (challenging
enhancement of attorney fee award); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495
U.S. 33 (1990) (challenging district court's order imposing
property tax increases to fund school desegregation program);
Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. 2038 (1995) (challenging court-
imposed obligation to continue funding various components
of school desegregation program).
ity education programs for all students attending the
KCMSD. These educational programs were designed to
eliminate the vestiges of segregation by raising educa-
tional performance and to compensate the District's
black schoolchildren by improving the quality of educa-
tion provided to them.'6 The total cost of the quality
education programs exceeded $220 million by 1995.17
II. MAGNET SCHOOLS PLAN
In 1985 the district court ordered the implementa-
tion of a magnet school program 8 and extensive capital
improvements for the District's schools. Between 1985
and 1987 every high school, every middle school, and
one-half of the elementary schools in the District were
converted into magnet schools.' 9 The district court jus-
tified its magnet school program on the grounds that it
would serve the dual purpose of improving student
achievement in the KCMSD and desegregating the Dis-
trict by attracting non-minority students into the Dis-
trict.'The district court relied upon magnet schools,
instead of imposing mandatory student reassignments
because the Court found that mandatory reassignments
would increase the instability of the KCMSD and re-
duce the potential for desegregation. Since its inception,
the magnet school program has operated at a cost in
excess of $448 million.2'
IIl. SALARY INCREASES
In 1985 the district court ordered the KCMSD to
raise the salaries of all teachers in the District. Subse-
quently, the district court ordered salary increases for all
but three of the approximately 5,000 KCMSD employ-
ees.2 The district court ordered these salary increases
based upon its finding that high quality personnel were
necessary not only to improve educational opportuni-
ties and reduce racial isolation, but also to ensure that
there was no diminution in the quality of the District's
16d. at 2042.
17 d. at 2043.
18Magnet schools are public schools designed to promote
integration by drawing students away from their neighborhoods
and private schools through distinctive curricula and high qual-
ity educational programs. Id. n.1.
'9 Id. at 2043.
'Old. at 2075.
21 Id. at 2043.
2Id. at 2044.
311 F.3d at 766.
24 115 S.Ct. at 2044.
75Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
26855 F.2d 1295 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
271d. at 1302 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974) (Miiiken 1)). In Miliken I a district court had ordered
an interdistrict remedy in a case involving only an intradistrict
violation because "any less comprehensive solution"would "re-
sult in an all black school system immediately surrounded by
regular educational programs.23 The total cost of this
component of the desegregation plan exceeded $200
million by 1995. Overall, the costs of running the de-
segregation program for the entire District approached
$200 million annually by 1995.24
IV. LITIGATION HISTORY
In 1988, the State unsuccessfully brought a broad
challenge to the district court's desegregation plan. In
Jenkinsv. MissourF the State argued that the magnet school
plan constituted an interdistrict remedy for an intradistrict
injury in violation of Miliiken v. Bradey.21 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the State's
position, and in 1989 the State petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for certiorari. 28
The State's petition for certiorari presented two is-
sues for review. First, the petition challenged the dis-
trict court's authority to order a property tax increase to
fund its remedial program. Second, the petition chal-
lenged the legitimacy of the magnet school plan. 9 The
Supreme Court accepted the taxation question and de-
cided that while the district court had no authority to
impose the tax measure itself, the court could require
the District to tax property at a rate adequate to fund its
share of the costs of the desegregation remedy30 The
Supreme Court refused to hear the State's foundational
challenge to the legitimacy of the magnet school plan."'
In 1992 the State again unsuccessfully contested
several of the district court's remedial orders.32 Having
failed to win its foundational challenge in the 1989 case
before the Supreme Court, the State shifted its approach
and instead challenged the need for continued district
court supervision. To that end, the State contested the
district court's 1992 order requiring the State to con-
tinue funding the quality education programs for the
1992-1993 school year.33 The State also challenged an
order requiring the State to finance salary increases for
virtually all of the KCMSD employees.
3 4
practically all white suburban school systems." 418 U.S. at 735.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, hold-
ing that before a district court can order an interdistrict rem-
edy, there must be a showing that racially discriminatory con-
duct had been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation.
'Id. at 745. Because the record contained only evidence of the
dejure segregation in the inner-city schools, there had been no
showing of significant violations by the outlying school dis-
tricts, and thus no evidence of interdistrict violation or effect.
Id. at 735.




1 Id. at 45.
32 Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirm-
ing district court's orders).
3id. at 760.
34Md. at 761.
The district court ordered that the programs be fully
funded, without reference to the State's complaints, and
the State appealed to the Eighth Circuit on several
grounds. First, the State argued that the district court
was required to make findings of fact on the issues raised
and that by failing to do so the district court had erred
as a matter of law.35 The court of appeals rejected the
State's argument,36 giving wide deference to the district
court. The court of appeals observed that although the
district court had not directly addressed the State's com-
plaints, the district court had satisfied its legal obliga-
tion to "rule" on the ultimate facts of the case; the dis-
trict court had"rejected" the State's complaints when it
had approved the 1992 budget for the District.37 More-
over, statements contained in a subsequent order from
the district court, "demonstrated the district court's
grasp" of the issue presented by the State. Finally, state-
ments made from the bench by the district court judge
"answered the concerns" of the court of appeals. 3
Second, and in the alternative, the State asserted
that the district court had abused its discretion by fail-
ing to withdraw judicial supervision in a timely man-
ner.39 The State argued that its sole obligation under the
desegregation decree was to implement the quality edu-
cation programs and that the quality education programs
had been successfully established and were superior to
programs offered in the suburban school districts. 4° Ac-
cordingly, the goal of the desegregation plan had been
achieved, and the district court should return control
over school policy to the local school district, notwith-
standing the fact that student achievement levels in the
District were still at or below national norms at many
grade levels.
41
The court of appeals again rejected the State's argu-
ments, finding that the State had failed to make a show-
ing sufficient to satisfy Freeman v. Pitts.42 Implementa-
tion of quality education programs, in and of itself, is
not sufficient grounds to support a finding of "partial
unitary status"43 and hence to permit withdrawal of ju-
dicial supervision.44 The district court's goal was to elimi-
nate the vestiges of segregation to the extent practicable,
and the quality education programs were simply tools
used to accomplish that goal. Accordingly, the court of







41 Id. at 762.
421d. at 765 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992)).
43 Freeman v. Pitts permits partial or total withdrawal of
district court supervision in the event a formerly segregated
(or "dual") school system becomes integrated (or "unitary").
503 U.S. at 471.
that the quality education programs had in fact succeeded
in remedying lost educational opportunities and improv-
ing student achievement, the State had presented no
evidence on the degree of progress it had made towards
eliminating the vestiges of segregation. 4 The State had
only presented evidence that "a start had been made."
46
Finally, the State challenged the court-imposed sal-
ary increases for virtually all the KCMSD employees.
47
The State argued that the salary increases were in ex-
cess of what was necessary to remedy the constitutional
violations at issue48 and that district court should have
denied the salary increases under Milliken II and Swan
because the increases did not directly address and relate
to the State's constitutional violation. The State con-
tended that the low teacher salaries did not flow from
any earlier constitutional violations by the State and that
the salaries of non-teacher personnel are simply beyond
the power of the district court to reach.
4
9
In rejecting the State's argument, the Eighth Cir-
cuit criticized the State's approach as being too narrowYs°
Contrary to the State's characterization of Supreme
Court precedent, district courts are empowered under
Milliken Hf with broad authority to approve remedial
programs. The district court had not acted improperly
in this case, but had based its order upon logic and em-
pirical data. Specifically, the district court had observed
in its order that the desegregation plan had suffered in
the past from the District's difficulty in hiring and re-
taining qualified personnel and had noted that high qual-
ity personnel were necessary to improve the educational
opportunities in KCMSD and to reduce racial isolation.
The district court had also found that the salary increases
would improve desegregative attractiveness of the Dis-
trict, thereby facilitating the desegregation of the Dis-
trict.sl In short, the court of appeals determined that
the salary increases were proper because, in addition to
compensating the victims, the remedy was also designed
to reverse white flight by offering superior educational
opportunities.12 The court of appeals denied rehearing
en banc, with five justices dissenting.5
3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
(1) whether the district court exceeded its constitutional
authority when it granted salary increases to virtually all
instructional and non-instructional employees and (2)
4411 F.3d at 764.
4 5 Id. at 764.
46Id. at 765.
47 Id. at 767.
4 8 Id. at 766.
49 Id. at 767.
5 Id. at 767.
s' Id. at 768.
52Id. at 768.
53Jenkins v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1994).
whether the district court properly relied upon the fact
that student achievement test scores had failed to rise to
some unspecified level when it declined to find that the
State had achieved partial unitary status as to the qual-
ity of education programs.14
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court held in a 5-4
opinion that the Missouri Federal District Court ex-
ceeded its remedial authority when it ordered the State
of Missouri to fund salary increases for City School Dis-
tricts and to continue to fund remedial quality educa-
tion programs. The Supreme Court found that the dis-
trict court's order approving salary increases was
grounded in an effort to create a magnet school district
and that such a goal was beyond the scope of the
intradistrict violations. In addition, the Supreme Court
determined that the district court's order requiring the
State to continue to fund remedial quality education
programs was grounded in an effort to improve student
achievement levels, which was not an appropriate test
for deciding whether the dual school systemhad achieved
partial unitary status.Accordingly, the case was remanded
to the district court to determine if, consistent with the
Supreme Court opinion, district court supervision should
be withdrawn.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
I. PRELIMINARY PROCEDURAL ISSUE: REVIEW
OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S MAGNET
SCHOOL PLAN IS PROPER AND PRU)ENT
In reversing the district court's order of salary in-
creases, the Supreme Court also reached a broader, foun-
dational issue and invalidated the district court's mag-
net school plan.s5 The Respondents, Kansas City school-
children, initially sought to prevent the Supreme Court
from reviewing this aspect of the case by challenging
the Court's authority on a procedural level to review
the legitimacy of the magnet school plan. 6 This founda-
tional issue had been raised in the State's 1988 petition
for certiorari, but ignored by the Supreme Court when
the Court chose to hear only the taxation question. The
State did not again raise this question when it returned
to the Supreme Court with its 1994 petition for certio-
rari.17 As a result, respondents argued, the State could
no longer challenge, and the Supreme Court should not
s4115 S.Ct. at 2046.
55Id. at 2046-2048.
56 d. at 2046.
57 Id. at 2076.
'Isd. at 2046.
"I1d. at 2047.
decide, the legitimacy of the district court's magnet
school plan.-"
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, defended
the Supreme Court's authority to decide the founda-
tional issue, stating that the parties had fair warning that
the issue would be considered by the Supreme Court
and that a challenge to the district court's remedial au-
thority was fairly included in the question presented s9
First, the mere fact that the Supreme Court had de-
clined to review the magnet school plan in 1988 would
not preclude the Supreme Court from considering the
issue later. The denial of writ of certiorari "imports no
expression of opinion upon the merits of the case."60 The
Supreme Court had neither approved nor disapproved
the Eighth Circuit's conclusion in 1988 that the district
court's remedy was proper.
61
Second, Justice Rehnquist contended that because
the State challenged the district court's order of salary
increases as beyond the court's remedial authority, analy-
sis of the scope of the district court's remedial authority
was necessary for a proper determination of whether
the salary increases were proper. In short, review of the
magnet school plan was an issue subsidiary to the Su-
preme Court's ultimate inquiry and thus properly in-
cluded in the question presented for review.
62
Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in which
she affirmed, in stronger language, the propriety of the
Supreme Court's review of the magnet school plan. First,
based upon her reading of the State's petition for certio-
rari, Justice O'Connor asserted that the foundational
challenge was not simply an issue prior to the State's
presented question, but was an issue presented in the
question itself and, as such, was one that the Supreme
Court appropriately and necessarily considered in an-
swering the State's question.63 Second, Justice O'Connor
observed that the foundational issue had been addressed
with some specificity at each stage of the litigation be-
low and, accordingly, the respondents had ignored the
issue "at their peril." In short, the Supreme Court had
resolved a genuine dispute that was properly presented
for decision.6
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, dissented, arguing that the decision to re-
view the scope of the district court's authority was both
improper and imprudent. 6 The standard under Rule
14.1, Justice Souter argued, limits issues before the Court
to those issues which must be resolved in order to an-
swer the question presented. The State's challenge in
this case was narrow, and the dispute between the par-
60Id. at 2046.
61Id. at 2047.




ties could have been resolved without reaching the va-
lidity of the magnet school plan.66
Moreover, even if the Court were correct that the
foundational issue could be reached procedurally, the
case nonetheless presented a compelling case for limit-
ing Supreme Court review to the question presented by
the State. Because the respondents "naturally" did not
expect the Supreme Court to focus on the State's foun-
dational challenge,6 the critical question was "whether
the issue may fairly be decided without dear warning,
at the culmination of a course of litigation in which the
Supreme Court has specifically refused to consider the
issue and given no indication of any subsequent changes
of mind."68 In Justice Souter's opinion, the questions
presented by the State could be answered readily and
on their own terms, and prudence dictated that the Court
refrain from addressing an issue not adequately briefed
or argued by the respondents.6
II. SCOPE OF FEDERAL COURTS' AUTHORITY
TO REMEDYDEJURE RACIAL SEGREGATION
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A. Broum v. Board of Education And Its Progeny
Fifteen years after Brown v. Board of Education,70 the
Supreme Court in Green v. County School Board" ac-
knowledged that the promise of Brown had yet to be
achieved and charged school boards and district courts
with the affirmative duty to take "whatever steps might
be necessary" to convert dual school systems into uni-
tary systems such that racial discrimination would be
eliminated "root and branch."7 Two years later, the Su-
preme Court in Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education7 recognized that a district court's discretion
is not without limits and that the court's efforts to elimi-
nate racial discrimination in public schools should not
attempt to achieve broader purposes lying beyond the
jurisdiction of the school authorities.74 In 1974, in
Milliken v. Bradley I,75 the Supreme Court held that a





70347 U.S. 483 (1954).
71391 US. 430 (1969).
' Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 439-438
(1969).
73402 U.S. 1 (1971).
74 Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402
U.S. 1, 22-23 (1971)
7-418 U.S. 717 (1974).
'6Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746-747 (1974)
(Milliken 1).
77423 U.S. 267 (1977).
"interdistrict" relief where the surrounding school dis-
tricts had not themselves been guilty of any constitu-
tional violations.7 6 Three years later, in Milliken v. Brad-
ley 11,77 the Court cautioned district courts to carefully
tailor their remedial schemes to the scope of the consti-
tutional violation at issue and articulated a three-part
framework to guide district courts in the exercise of their
remedial authority7
8
B. The District Court Exceeded The Scope Of Its
Remedial Authority
In.Missouri v. Jenkins the Supreme Court relied upon
Swan, Milliken I, and Milliken II to find that the district
court had exceeded the scope of its authority when it
granted salary increases to virtually all instructional and
non-instructional employees.79 The salary increases were
part of the district court's magnet school plan, and would
have been proper had they been designed solely to re-
move the racial identity of the various schools in the
District with disproportionately high percentages of
black students, or solely to remedy the reduction in stu-
dent achievement caused by the KCMSD's system of de
jure segregation.10 However, the district court had not
limited its magnet school plan to specific schools within
the District, but had targeted virtually every school in
the District for improvement in an acknowledged at-
tempt to attract non-minority students from outside the
District. The district court's ambitious plan had "all but
made the KCMSD itself into a magnet district."8' As a
result, the district court's plan had an interdistrict goal
without an interdistrict injury, and the remedy was im-
proper under Milliken L The district court had devised a
remedy to accomplish indirectly what it admittedly
lacked the remedial authority to mandate directly.82
In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court re-
jected arguments offered by the respondent schoolchil-
dren that an interdistrict remedy was justified by the
district court's findings that segregation had caused white
flight from the District to the surrounding, suburban
districts. The Supreme Court examined the district
I8Milliken v. Bradley II, 423 U.S. 267, 280-281 (1977)
(Milliken 11). First, the nature of the desegregation remedy is
to be determined by the nature and scope of the constitu-
tional violation, and the remedy must therefore be related to
the condition alleged to offend the Constitution. Second, the
decree must indeed be remedial in nature and must be de-
signed as nearly as possible to restore the victims of discrimi-
natory conduct to the position they would have occupied in
the absence of such conduct. Third, the federal courts in de-
vising a remedy must take into account the interests of state
and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent
with the Constitution. Id.
19115 S.Ct. at 2048-49.
11Id. at 2051.
81 Id. at 2051.
821d. at 2051.
court's findings on this issue, and concluded that the
record was internally inconsistent and did not support
the "typical supposition" that white flight patterns re-
sult from desegregation, not de jure segregation. 1 As a
result, the district court was not justified in employing
an interdistrict remedy.
The Supreme Court also criticized the district court
for designing a remedial scheme that was not carefully
tailored to the scope of the constitutional injuryr' First,
while it is theoretically possible that additional per stu-
dent expenditures may function to increase non-minor-
ity enrollment, such a rationale could not serve as the
basis for the district court's remedial order because it
was simply not susceptible of any objective limitation.
Any expenditures, for whatever reason, could theoreti-
cally make the District in some way more attractive. As
a result, the district court's magnet school plan was in-
consistent with Milliken II, in that it was not limited
to restoring the victims of discriminatory conduct to the
position they would have occupied in the absence of
such conduct. Instead, the district court had used its
magnet school plan as a pretext for improving the qual-
ity of education in the District. 5
Finally, the majority criticized the district court for
designing a remedial scheme which violated principles
of federalism.8 According to the majority, the remedial
scheme upset the balance between state and local gov-
ernments by making the local school district increasingly
dependent upon funding from the state. Justice
Rehnquist described local school district autonomy as a
vital national tradition and asserted that the ultimate
goal of a desegregation decree is to restore state and lo-
cal authorities to control of the school district.87 Such a
result was fast becoming impossible in the case of the
KCMSD because the remedial scheme had the effect of
making the local school district increasingly dependent
upon funding from the state In sum, the Supreme Court
reversed the district court's orders because they were
beyond the district court's remedial authority and be-
cause, in design, they were too far removed from the
task of eliminating racial imbalance in the District. 8
Ill. PARTIAL TERMINATION OF CONSENT DE-
CREE AND WITHDRAWAL OF DISTRICT
COURT SUPERVISION
83Id. at 2052.





89347 U.S. 483 (1954).
90115 S.Ct. at 2049.
91503 U.S. 467 (1992).
A. Freeman v. Pitts and Board of Oklahoma City
Public Schools v. Dowell
Since Brown v. Board of Education 9 the Supreme
Court has stressed that, although district courts' deseg-
regation programs should be designed to fully compen-
sate the victims of discrimination, the programs' ulti-
mate goal should be to return control over school policy
to local school districts.90 In recent years the Supreme
Court has established standards for determining when
withdrawal ofjudicial supervision is appropriate. In 1992,
the Supreme Court in Freeman v. Pis 9' described the
three-part showing a local school district must make
before it may receive partial or total relief from district
court supervision.9 2 In 1991, in Board of Oklahoma City
Public Schools v. DowelP3 the Court emphasized that fed-
eral supervision of local school systems should be a tem-
porary measure and should terminate at the earliest pos-
sible date.94 Both cases stated that the "ultimate inquiry"
is whether the state or school district has complied in
good faith with the desegregation decree and whether
the vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated
"to the extent practicable."95
B. The District Court Improperly Relied Upon Low
Student Scores When It Declined To Find That The
State Had Achieved Partial Unitary Status As To
The Quality Of Education Programs.
In Missouri v. Jenkins, the State relied upon Dowell
and Freeman to challenge the district court's order re-
quiring the State to continue funding the District's qual-
ity education programs. 96 The State argued that, even
assuming a mandate for improvement in student achieve-
ment was justified originally, its indefinite expansion until
national standards were met was not. States are entitled
to a precise statement of their obligations under a de-
segregation decree and the State had satisfied those ob-
ligations when it implemented the ordered programs.91
The Supreme Court agreed with the State in prin-
ciple, but observed that its review of the issue was need-
lessly complicated because the district court had not
produced adequate findings and because the court of
appeals had failed to remand the issue to the district
court.9 Observing that the district court had never iden-
tified the precise incremental effect that segregation had
92Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491 (1992).
93498 U.S. 237 (1991).
9 Board of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498
U.S. 237, 250 (1991).
9-Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492 (quoting Dowell, 498 U.S. at
249-250).
96115 S.Ct. at 2055.
97Id. at 2055.
98Id. at 2055.
had on minority student achievement, and faulting the
court of appeals for attempting to assemble an adequate
record from the district court's bench statements and
unrelated orders, the Supreme Court remanded the is-
sue to the district court for further findings.
s9
The Supreme Court directed the district court to
reconsider its expansive orders in light of Freeman v.
Pitts1i The district court was reminded that the State's
role with respect to the quality education program had
been limited to funding of the program, not implemen-
tation of the program.'01 Moreover, the district court was
instructed to sharply limit, if not dispense with, its reli-
ance on test scores as a factor guiding its decision mak-
ing) 02 Numerous "external factors" beyond the control
of the KCMSD can affect minority student achievement,
Justice Rehnquist asserted, and blind insistence upon
academic goals unrelated to the effects of de jure segre-
gation unwarrantably postpone the day when the
KCMSD will be able to operate on its own.1 3
The majority also instructed the district court to
consider that many goals of the quality education plan
had already been obtained. Accordingly, the district court
should recognize that the end purpose of its remedial
program was not to remedy the constitutional violation
to the maximum extent possible. Rather, the district
court should bear in mind that its purpose was to rem-
edy the constitutional violation to the extent practicable
and also to restore control of the school system to state
and local authorities.'01
In sum, the majority did not expressly disqualify
quality education programs from serving as a compo-
nent of the district court's desegregation plan. The ma-
jority was, however, skeptical that low test scores in
1995 could properly be attributed to the State's prior
constitutional violation. Accordingly, the majority was
reluctant to allow the district court to rely upon low
9Id. at 2055.
100Id, at 2055.The three-part test guides district courts in
determining when the objectives of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion have been met, and, hence, when a district court may
withdraw supervision of a school system previously found to
have operated in violation of the Constitution. In Freeman v.
Pitts, the Court stated:
Among the factors which must inform the sound discre-
tion of the court in ordering partial withdrawal are the follow-
ing: (1) whether there has been full and satisfactory compli-
ance with the decree in those aspects of the system where
supervision is to be withdrawn; (2) whether retention of judi-
cial control is necessary or practicable to achieve compliance
with the decree in other facets of the school system; and (3)
whether the school district has demonstrated, to the public
and the parents and students of the once disfavored race, its
good-faith commitment to the whole of the courts' decree
and to those provisions of the law and the Constitution that
were the predicate for judicial intervention in the first instance.
503 U.S. at 491.
101 15 S.Ct. at 2055.
test scores as a justification for continued judicial super-
vision.
C. Practical Consequences and Ramifications For
Future School Desegregation Cases
The divergence in test scores between black and
white schoolchildren was first identified in the 1950's
as evidence that the education black students received
at predominantly black schools was inferior to the edu-
cation they received at predominantly white schools. 05
The fact that this divergence in test scores persists is, for
many, an unfortunate indication that public schools, al-
though purportedly integrated, have not sufficiently
improved the education offered to black schoolchil-
dren. 06 In Missouri v. Jenkins, ten years after the imple-
mentation of the most expensive remedial program in
the history of school desegregation, a majority of the
Supreme Court found that the persistence of low test
scores in a school district could not, by itself, justify con-
tinued judicial supervision.
On a general level, Missouri v. Jenkins continues the
trend initiated by the Supreme Court's most recent
school desegregation cases, Freeman v. Pits and Okla-
homa v. Dowell, in that the Jenkins opinion urges federal
courts to be skeptical of traditional rationales offered to
explain continued judicial supervision and instructs fed-
eral courts to give greater weight to evidence of good
faith compliance by the states.107 More practically, al-
though the Supreme Court stopped short of expressly
dismantling the challenged components of the district
court's desegregation plan,1° the district court's discre-
tion will be more limited on remand, and the district
court will most likely be required to establish a closer
nexus between the State's former system of school seg-
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IV. JUSTICE SOUTER'S DISSENT
In a dissenting opinion in which he was joined by
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice Souter
criticized the majority for deciding issues not properly
before the Court, for mischaracterizing the lower courts'
decisions, and for taking an unduly restrictive view of
Supreme Court precedent."' Nothing in the record be-
low persuaded Justice Souter that the district court's
factual basis was obviously incorrect, and accordingly
the district court's orders were entitled to deference."?
Moreover, nothing in Supreme Court precedent per-
suaded Justice Souter that the district court's use of a
magnet school plan was impermissible.' 3 In short, the
Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Jenkins was "an-
chored in neither the findings and evidence contained
in the record, nor in controlling precedent, which is
squarely at odds with the Court's holding today.""
4
A. The District Court Did Not Err In Rejecting
The State's Plea For Partial Unitary Status
Justice Souter disagreed with the majority's resolu-
tion of the test score issue, and characterized the
majority's decision as grounded in word play, not sub-
stance.' 5 Contrary to the assertions of the majority, Jus-
tice Souter contended that test scores had not played a
dispositive role in the lower courts' decisions and or-
ders." 6 None of the lower courts' opinions or orders re-
quired a certain level of test scores to be achieved be-
fore unitary status could be found, and none of the pro-
ceedings below indicated that test scores were a
dispositive factor. Indeed, any references in the record
to test scores related to an entirely different and subse-
quent district court order which was not under review
and which was quoted in the Court of Appeals' opinion
only because that court canvassed subsequent district
court orders during its review of the district court's 1992
order."'
Test scores, then, did not explain the lower courts'
noting that same requirement may also apply to other vestiges
of discrimination plaintiffs may raise). See also Daniel B.
Kohrman & Kathryn M. Woodruff, The 1994-5 Term Of The
United States Supreme CourtAnd Its Impact Upon Public Schools,
102 ED. LAw REP. 421, (1995) (observing that Missouri v. Jenkins
opinion favors detailed articulation of links between broad
desegregation goals and specific remedial measures).
I0 See Commentary, supra note 137.
"' Id. at 2074.
"21d. at 2084.
13Id. at 2087.
"4 Id. at 2078.
Is Id. at 2078.
refusal to find in favor of the State on the issue of partial
unitary status. Rather, the district court had rejected the
State's plea for partial release from judicial supervision
because the State did not even attempt to make the
showing required under Freeman v. Pitts for the relief
requested.'"8 The duty and responsibility of the State in
this case was to take all steps necessary to eliminate the
vestiges of the unconstitutional de jure system of school
segregation, and the burden of showing that the State's
duties have been met rests squarely on the State." 9 In
short, the Supreme Court has established an orderly
procedural course for petitions requesting partial termi-
nation of a desegregation decree, and the State's failure
to meet or even recognize its burden under Freeman led
to the result below.10
B. Deference To The District Court's Salary Orders
Was Proper
Justice Souter also disagreed with the majority's re-
jection of the district court's order of salary increases.
Contrary to the majority's assertion, the district court
did not ground its order solely in the goal of attracting
non-minority students back to the KCMSD.'12 Rather,
the district court consistently treated salary increases as
an important element in remedying the system-wide
reduction in student achievement resulting from segre-
gation in the District,'" a proper objective under Milliken
L123 Accordingly, the district court's order was entitled
to deference, and the only issue properly presented for
review was whether the salary increases were reason-
ably related to achieving their stated goal.'
24
C The Majority's Review Of The Magnet School Plan
. Was Unduly Restrictive
Finally, Justice Souter faulted the majority for re-
jecting the district court's magnet school plan. 25 First,
Justice Souter argued that the Supreme Court was not
justified in overturning the district court's findings of
fact on the issue of white flight. 2 6 Normally, a district
court's findings of fact are entitled to deference on ap-
pellate review.2 7 Here, not only had the majority not
shown that the lower courts were wrong on the facts,
161d. at 2078.
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but it had also based its findings upon "arbitrary suppo-
sitions" about the causes of white flight in the KCMSD.2 8
The Supreme Court's decision rested upon "shaky
grounds" and proceeded from a series of questionable
assumptions. Under such circumstances, reversal of the
lower courts' findings of fact was "simply rash."'29
Second, Justice Souter argued that the majority's
rejection of the magnet school plan followed from an
erroneous interpretation of Supreme Court precedent.
In particular, Justice Souter disputed the Court's asser-
tion that Milliken I applied to this case simply because
the district court's remedy was meant to produce ef-
fects outside the district in which the violation oc-
curred.130 Although precedent does limit district courts'
ability to impose compulsory interdistrict remedies on
surrounding school districts, precedent does not define
an interdistrict remedy as any remedy that takes into
account conditions outside of the district. 31 To the con-
trary, Milliken I left open the possibility that a district
court might impose a remedy with intended effects ex-
tending beyond the district in cases where such a rem-
edy was necessary to redress the harms flowing from the
constitutional violation. 32 In short, the majority
mischaracterized Milliken I as categorically forbidding
imposition of any remedy with intended effects outside
of the offending district, and therefore substantially lim-
ited the remedies that a district court may impose in
school desegregation cases.'
33
Justice Souter also asserts that, in addition to re-
writing Milliken I, the majority opinion also effectively
overruled another established Supreme Court precedent,
Hills v. Gautreaux.'34 In Gautreaux, the Supreme Court
applied Milliken I to a case challenging the segregation
of public housing. 35 The Supreme Court held that a
district court may subject a governmental perpetrator
of segregative practices to an order for relief with in-
tended consequences beyond the perpetrator's own sub-
division, even in the absence of effects outside the sub-
division, so long as the decree does not bind the authori-
ties of other governmental units that are free of viola-
tions and segregative effects. 36 Once a district is found
guilty of a constitutional violation, the district court is
authorized to make every effort to achieve the greatest
possible degree of relief Those efforts may include re-
medial plans that have an intended impact beyond the
boundaries of the district where the violation occurred,
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bound by the district court's order.137
Justice Souter concluded by observing that the
majority's unfortunate distortion of Hills v. Gautreaux
demonstrated the major peril of addressing important
and complex questions without adequate notice to the
parties. 38 Gautreaux was mentioned only in passing by
the respondents, was mischaracterized in the State's brief,
and was effectively overruled by the Court's opinion.
Justice Souter would reserve final judgment on the is-
sue until the subject was given adequate briefing and a
full hearing.
139
V. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor addressed
specific arguments raised in Justice Souter's dissenting
opinion. In doing so, Justice O'Connor emphasized the
limits placed upon federal courts by Supreme Court
precedent and by Article III of the Constitution.
A. Hills v. Gautreaux
Justice O'Connor disputed Justice Souter's assertion
that Hills v. Gautreaux was effectively overruled.
140
Gautreaux followed Milliken I and did not dispense with
the requirement that an interdistrict remedy is permis-
sible only upon a showing that there has been a consti-
tutional violation within one district that produced a
significant segregative effect in another district.
Gautreaux is an affirmation of, not a deviation from,
Milliken L' 4' Both cases stand for the proposition that
the scope of desegregative remedies are determined by
the nature and extent of the constitutional violation, and
neither case gives federal courts "a blank check to im-
pose unlimited remedies upon a constitutional viola-
tor."
14 2
B. The Court's Resolution Of the Dispute Did Not
Impose An Unduly Limited View Of Segregative
Effects
Justice O'Connor also disputed Justice Souter's as-
sertion that the majority took an unduly restrictive ap-
proach to the magnet school plan. According to Justice
Souter, the majority erroneously disallowed an
interdistrict remedy in this case because it failed to rec-
ognize that white flight from the District had signifi-
136d. at 2088.
137 Id. at 2089.
138Id. at 2089.
'39Id. at 2090.
40 Id. at 2057. See also id. at 2053 (Rehnquist, J.) (disput-
ing Justice Souter's Gautreaux arguments).
1411d. at 2059.
'42Id. at 2058.
cant effects on the surrounding districts; just because
the departing students had been absorbed into wholly
unitary systems did not mean that there had been no
significant effects outside the district and that an
interdistrict remedy was not justified. 43 Justice
O'Connor rejected this reasoning, arguing that the rel-
evant inquiry under Milliken I and Gautreaux is not
whether the intradistrict violation produced effects of
any sort beyond the district, but rather whether such
violation directly caused significant segregative effects
across district boundaries.I44
Significant segregative effects occur, for example,
where surrounding school districts actively contribute
to the constitutional violation by acts intended to segre-
gate the races - ag., where those districts arrange for
students residing in one district to attend schools in sur-
rounding districts.14 Similarly, in cases where the
intradistrict violation causes white schoolchildren to flee
the district, an interdistrict remedy may be appropri-
ate.146 Where, as here, a district court explicitly finds
that the system of de jure segregation caused neither an
interdistrict violation nor significant interdistrict segre-
gative effects, the district court may not make
desegregative attractiveness an underlying goal of its rem-
edy for the specific purpose of reversing white flight into
the surrounding school districts. However troubling
white flight may be, Justice O'Connor insisted, remedy-
ing it is not within a district court's authority unless the
white flight is shown to be directly caused by the con-
stitutional violation.
147
C. Federal Courts Do Not Have The Authority To
Remedy The Myriad Factors Of Human Existence
Which Can Cause Racial Discrimination
Justice O'Connor concluded with words of caution
to federal courts. The district court's authority in Mis-
souri v. Jenkins, like other school desegregation litiga-
tion, was limited to elimination of a constitutional vio-
lation - i.e, the elimination of the dual school system
- not "the myriad factors of human existence which
can cause discrimination in a multitude ofways"'148Those
myriad factors are not readily corrected by judicial in-
tervention, but are best addressed by the representative
branches. 49 Federal courts, unlike the legislature, are
constrained by Article III from prescribing "palliatives
for societal ills."' 5 Unlike Congress, which enjoys dis-
cretion in determining whether and what legislation is
1
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needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the federal courts have no comparable license and
must always observe their limited judicial role) 5'
VI. JUSTICE THOMAS' CONCURRENCE
Justice Thomas joined the majority decision on the
two remedial issues presented for review, but wrote sepa-
rately to "add a few thoughts with respect to the overall
course of this litigation."' In particular, Justice Thomas
identified two branches of Supreme Court jurisprudence
which have "produced this unfortunate situation in which
a district court has taken it upon itself to experiment
with the education of KCMSD's black youth."153 First,
the district court misread Supreme Court precedent "to
support the theory that black students suffer an unspeci-
fied psychological harm from segregation that retards
their mental and educational development," an approach
which "not only relies upon questionable social science,
but... also rests upon an assumption of black inferior-
ity.f" Second, Supreme Court precedent has, in the past,
permitted federal courts to exercise virtually unlimited
equitable powers to remedy "the alleged constitutional
violation" of school segregation. 5s The exercise of that
authority has "trampled upon" principles of federalism
and separation of powers and has freed federal courts to
pursue other agendas unrelated to the narrow purpose
of remedying a constitutional harm.'S6
VII. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S DISSENT
Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent, but
wrote separately to emphasize a consideration key to
the controversy, namely the State of Missouri's "deep,
inglorious history of segregation." 5 7 Justice Ginsburg
described the more than two centuries of firmly en-
trenched official discrimination in Missouri public
schools, and noted that the first federal remedial order
in this case was issued only ten years ago. Viewed against
this historical backdrop, the Supreme Court's decision
vitiating the desegregation efforts at this time was "an
action at once too swift and too soon."'
CONCLUSION
In Missouri v. Jenkins the United States Supreme
Court rejected a district court's reliance on low student
test scores as a justification for continued judicial super-
151 Id. at 2061.
112 Id. at 2062.
'5id. at 2062.
154 Id. at 2062.
'5-id. at 2062.
56 Id. at 2062.
57 Id. at 2091.
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vision and invalidated a magnet school program as be-
yond the scope of the district court's remedial author-
ity. Missouri v. Jenkins therefore adds both to Supreme
Court precedent defining the limits of a district court's
remedial power in school desegregation cases, as well as
to precedent defining the circumstances under which
withdrawal of judicial supervision in school desegrega-
tion cases is appropriate.
Perhaps more generally, Missouri v. Jenkins also re-
describes the difficult balancing act which district courts
must perform in school desegregation cases. In Brown v..
Board of Education the Supreme Court established that
on the one hand district courts must ensure that equal
educational opportunities are restored to black school-
children and on the other hand district courts must en-
sure that control and autonomy are restored to local
school districts. In Freeman v. Pitts, the Supreme Court
reminded district courts that the burden rests entirely
on the constitutional violator to show good faith com-
pliance with the Constitution. In Missouri v. Jenkins, the
Supreme Court cautioned district courts to avoid wag-
ing campaigns for social justice and instructed district
courts to avoid remedial programs which, although jus-
tified, might somehow impair the balance between state
and local power. In effect, the Supreme Court seemed
more willing to believe in the good faith compliance of
the State and seemed less willing to defer to the district
court's judgment that educational disparities in the Dis-
trict were, in fact, causally related to constitutional vio-
lations. The end result is that Missouri v. Jenkins limits
the discretion of federal district courts and rebalances
the equities in favor of local school districts.
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